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The Netherlands
1. SUMMARY
The possibilities within the Royal Netherlands Air Force
(RNLAF) maintenance system to establish reliability data
relevant for the in-service nondestructive inspection of F-16
airframe structure are described. The principal inspection
techniques herewith are manual and automatic eddy current
inspection for the detection of fatigue cracking. Use is made
of field inspection data registered in the Core Automated
Maintenance System (CAMS) for specific airframe inspection
points within the F-16 Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
(ASIP). The available data include the registration of the
number of cracks and the length of the largest crack found
during the phased inspections. Further, use is made of crack
growth data obtained from the aircraft manufacturer. An
evaluation of the field inspection data and the crack growth
data allows the estimation of the sensitivity and reliability of
inspection for the structural details concerned. The results of
this evaluation can be used to revise the current values of the
inspection intervals for the ASIP inspection points.
2. INTRODUCTION
Nondestructive inspection (NDI) is an integral part of aircraft
maintenance. It is important to select the appropriate NDI
techniques and to select the inspection times in terms of initial
inspection (inspection threshold) and inspection interval,
especially because of their impact on the balance between
flight safety and maintenance costs. A too conservative
maintenance approach could include unnecessarily frequent
inspections resulting in high maintenance costs without an
additional increase in flight safety. On the other hand,
insufficient maintenance (inspection) could directly lead to an
unacceptably low level of flight safety.
The selection of appropriate NDI techniques and the inspection
frequency are related to each other because aircraft such as the
F-16 have been designed in accordance with the Damage
Tolerance (DT) design philosophy (Ref. 1). Damage Tolerance
can be defined as "the ability of aircraft structure to sustain
anticipated loads (e.g. limit load) in the presence of fatigue,
corrosion or accidental damage until such damage is detected
through inspections (or malfunctions) and repaired". In the DT
design philosophy it is assumed that flaws already exist in the
structure as manufactured, and that the structure may be
inspectable or non-inspectable in service. Non-inspectable
structures must be designed in such a way that the initial
damage will not propagate to a critical size (causing failure)
during the design service life. For inspectable structures the
initial damage must grow slowly and not reach a critical size
in some predetermined inspection interval.
The DT approach for inspectable structures is illustrated in
figure 1. It is conservatively assumed that all specimens of a
specified configuration contain an initial flaw (flaw size ai)
that propagates at a known rate. The assumed initial flaw size
is small and generally not detectable with current inspection
techniques. After a certain propagation time in service the flaw
becomes reliably detectable (flaw size ad) with a certain NDI
technique. Finally, the critical flaw size ac is assumed to be
known from fracture toughness data; ac is usually defined as
the flaw size for which the structure can just sustain limit load.
The initial inspection time (I1) and inspection interval (∆I) are
subsequently determined:
- I1 is the flaw propagation period from ai to ac (this
period is also called the "safety limit" SL) divided by a
safety factor. This factor is usually taken as 2 which
gives: I1 = ½ . SL.
- ∆I is the flaw propagation period from ad to ac (period
∆ = Ic - Id) divided by a safety factor. This factor is
usually taken as 2 which gives: ∆I = ½ . ∆.
The relation between the appropriate NDI technique and the
inspection frequency can now be understood. Visual inspection
or low level NDI inspection are low cost inspection methods
but have a relatively large detectable flaw size ad and
consequently a short inspection interval ∆I. On the other hand,
a more advanced NDI technique is more costly in application
but will have a smaller ad and, consequently, will have a larger
inspection interval. The aircraft operator has then the choice
between frequent inspections with relatively high ad inspection
techniques or less frequent inspections with relatively small ad
inspection techniques, both yielding a same level of cumulative
reliability of inspection.
In this paper first some general aspects of NDI reliability will
be discussed. Then, the possibilities within the Royal
Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) maintenance system to
establish reliability data, especially ad values, relevant for the
in-service nondestructive inspection of F-16 airframe structure
will be described. Use will be made of field inspection data
registered in the Core Automated Maintenance System
(CAMS) for specific airframe inspection points.
-4-
NLR-TP-98144
3. RELIABILITY OF NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION
The reliability of NDI is generally associated with the ability
of an inspector to detect flaws in the parts inspected. The
probability of detection (POD) for the flawed parts is then
usually taken as measure of the inspection performance. The
true POD for a particular flaw size, however, can only be
obtained by means of an infinite number of inspections. In
practice, a limited number of inspections will only yield an
estimated POD. To provide a measure of confidence in the
estimated POD, it is usual to incorporate confidence limits
(CL) resulting in lower-bound values of the POD. An often
quoted value for the reliably detectable flaw size is the 90/95
POD/CL value i.e. the flaw size for which we have 95 %
confidence that the true POD is 90 % or more.
In practice, however, the majority of the specimens inspected
are without flaws, yielding the possibility of obtaining a
spurious indication of a non-existing flaw. Hence, the result of
an inspection can be described by means of a quadrinomial
distribution, with successful and unsuccessful inspections of
both flawed and unflawed specimens (Fig. 2). In analogy with
the POD for the flawed specimens a probability of recognition
(POR) can be defined for the unflawed specimens. Also for the
POR, lower confidence limits can be calculated with statistical
methods. Often, the counterpart of POR viz. the false calls
probability (FCP) is used as inspection characteristic for the
unflawed parts. Both POD and POR (or FCP) are essential
inspection characteristics with their relative importance
depending on considerations of safety and economy (Ref. 2).
An attractive way to visualize the inspection performance is a
diagram in which the POD and POR (or FCP) values are
plotted against each other as the detection threshold is varied,
yielding a so-called "relative operating characteristic" or ROC
curve (Ref. 3). Such a diagram can be useful, for example for
the comparison of different inspection techniques and for the
performance ranking of individual inspectors.
In this paper we will focus on the POD for flawed parts
because this is the most important inspection characteristic
from a safety point of view.
4. NDI RELIABILITY DEMONSTRATION
Independent of the definition of the reliably detectable flaw
size ad, e.g. the 90/50 or 90/95 POD/CL value, one has to
determine the POD curve of the relevant NDI techniques for
a specific inspection configuration (specimen configuration),
see figure 3. For this purpose a so-called NDI reliability
demonstration program can be performed.
The design of such a program has been well addressed in an
AGARD SMP Lecture Series (Ref. 4). This document
describes testing and evaluation procedures for assessing the
capability of an NDI system in terms of POD and confidence
limits. NDI systems are herewith classified into two categories
depending on the outcome of an inspection: NDI systems
which produce only qualitative information as to the presence
or absence of a flaw ("hit/miss" data) and NDI systems which
record a signal response [â] that is correlated with the actual
size [a] of the indicated flaw ("â vs. a" data). For both NDI
systems, reference 4 gives recommendations for modelling the
POD and for calculating lower confidence bounds.
The design of a reliability demonstration program has also
been addressed in an FAA supported project at the Aging
Aircraft NDI Development and Demonstration Center in
Albuquerque (Ref. 5). The three-volume document presents a
generic protocol for the conducting of inspection reliability
experiments, it further presents a specific protocol for an eddy
current inspection reliability experiment, and it gives the
results of an actually performed reliability experiment at
different airline inspection facilities for the manual high-
frequency eddy current inspection of aircraft lap splice joints.
Topics addressed include the presentation of POD curves, the
treatment of false calls and the presentation of ROC curves.
Further, the NRC Institute for Aerospace Research (IAR) in
Canada has performed extensive NDI reliability studies and
experiments. For example reference 6 gives the results of an
AGARD round-robin NDI demonstration program in which six
laboratories in four NATO countries participated. In this
program several NDI procedures were evaluated for the
inspection of bolt holes of service-expired compressor disks
and spacers from the J85-CAN40 engine.
A reference book of available quantitative NDI data has been
compiled by the NTIAC in Austin (Ref. 7). This reference
book gives guidelines for demonstration of specific NDI
process capabilities and it provides more than 400 POD curves
for various NDI techniques applied for various inspection
configurations.
A well performed NDI reliability demonstration program can
yield the necessary reliability data, for example ad values, for
a certain inspection configuration. However, such programs
also have their limitations. Besides representativity of
inspection configuration and the influence of human factors,
the main limitations of performing an NDI reliability
demonstration program are the time and costs involved.
Especially the number of test specimens necessary for the
"reliable" determination of POD and ROC curves is very large.
For example, reference 4 recommends that the specimen set
should contain at least 60 flawed sites if the NDI system
provides only "hit/miss" results and at least 40 flawed sites if
the NDI system provides a quantitative response, "â vs. a"
data. Furthermore, to enable the estimation of the false call
rate, reference 4 recommends that the specimen set should
contain at least three times as many unflawed inspection sites
as flawed sites.
These limitations are the reason that NDI reliability
demonstration programs are infrequently performed and then
for applications with only one or with a limited number of
inspection configurations. When a large number of different
configurations is involved, as for NDI of airframe structure, it
is impractical to conduct these extensive programs for each
different structural detail. Different approaches can then be
distinguished:
- Conduct a limited number of NDI reliability
demonstration programs on selected structural details and
extrapolate the results of these programs to comparable
structural details.
- Make a conservative use of available data from the
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literature, for example of relevant POD curves from the
NDE capabilities data book (Ref. 7).
- Make use of field inspection data e.g. the NDI results of
in-service fleet inspections.
The last approach is an attractive option because of the
acquisition of relevant results and because of the relatively low
costs involved. Therefore, the "field data use" approach will be
further discussed for the in-service NDI of F-16 airframe
structure within the Royal Netherlands Air Force.
5. RNLAF IN-SERVICE NDI OF F-16 AIRFRAME
STRUCTURE
The general NDI procedures for the in-service inspection of
the F-16 airframe structure are described in reference 8. A
RNLAF supplement on this reference lists the specific
inspection control points within the F-16 Aircraft Structural
Integrity Program (ASIP). In this paper the attention will be
focused on the ASIP control points because of the crack
growth information available (e.g. crack growth curves, critical
flaw sizes) and because of the use of a comprehensive
registration system for the ASIP field inspection data i.e. the
Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS). When cracks
are detected during the inspection of an ASIP point, then the
number of cracks and the length of the largest crack found
(amongst other general data) are registered in the CAMS
system.
The values for initial inspection time (I1) and inspection
interval (∆I) for each ASIP point are listed in the Fleet
Structural Maintenance Plan (FSMP) for RNLAF F-16 aircraft.
The I1 and ∆I values have been derived using the Damage
Tolerance approach explained in chapter 3 (I1 = ½ . SL and
∆I = ½ . ∆), using fatigue crack growth curves relevant for
RNLAF usage (determined with a load spectrum based on the
actual RNLAF base usage) and using reliably detectable flaw
size ad values based on assumed in-service NDI capability.
The following ad values are currently used for the primary
NDI procedures of ASIP points (all flaw sizes relate to surface
crack lengths):
- Manual eddy current inspection: ad = 0.10, 0.20 or 0.25
inch, depending on the inspection location.
- Automatic eddy current inspection (rotating probe) of
bolt holes: ad = 0.075 inch.
- Magnetic particle inspection: ad = 0.10 inch.
The majority of the ASIP primary inspections include manual
and automatic eddy current inspection. Magnetic particle
inspection is only applied for a small number of ASIP points
(e.g. the canopy hook support fitting). Penetrant inspection is
only used as a back-up NDI procedure. Ultrasonic inspection
is applied for a number of inspection points (e.g. the shock
strut piston radius of the nose landing gear) but these
inspections are RNLAF specific.
Up to now, the ad values for the ASIP inspection points have
been based on assumed in-service NDI capability. These ad
values seem conservative when compared with values from the
literature. This means that the inspection intervals for these
points may be unnecessarily conservative (large). Therefore, it
is worthwhile to evaluate the available field inspection data in
CAMS and to assess realistic ad data for the ASIP inspection
points. This information can then possibly be used to revise the
current values of the ASIP inspection intervals.
6. POD ASSESSMENT USING FIELD INSPECTION
DATA
The CAMS system registers the number of cracks and the
length of the largest crack found during the inspection of an
ASIP point. The NDI signal responses [â] are not recorded, so
the NDI data base is of the "hit" type. Information of the sizes
of undetected cracks ("miss"), however, is necessary for the
construction of a POD curve (analysis of "hit/miss" data). But,
when crack growth data are available, for each crack detected
the previously missed crack sizes (during previous inspections)
can be estimated (Refs. 9, 10). When crack growth data are
not available, the data base will only contain crack detection
data. These data can then be used in a limited approach to
estimate ad values by plotting a Cumulative Distribution
Function of the crack sizes detected.
Crack growth data available
For most ASIP inspection points crack growth data are
available. These data include realistic crack growth curves and
values for the critical crack size ac. The crack growth curves
can be used to estimate the previously missed crack sizes for
each crack detected during an inspection. This procedure is
illustrated in figure 4. When this procedure is applied for the
inspection of an ASIP point for all aircraft in service, this will
result in an NDI data base of the "hit/miss" type for that
particular ASIP point. When sufficient data are available (see
chapter 4) a POD curve can be constructed. In the literature
different models of a POD curve for the analysis of "hit/miss"
data have been suggested. The most appropriate POD models
have been evaluated by the NRC/IAR using the inspection
results of actual aircraft engine disks containing service-
induced cracks (Ref. 11). It was concluded that the log-normal
regression function provides the most realistic POD results.
This function was also recommended in an AGARD SMP
Lecture Series (Ref. 4).
The log-normal model to relate the POD with crack size [a]
can be formulated as follows (after Ref. 4):
where Q(z) is the standard normal survivor function, z is the
(1)POD(a) 1 Q(z) ; z ( ln(a) µ) / σ
standard normal variate, and µ and σ are the location (mean)
and scale (standard deviation) parameters.
The two parameters (µ, σ) must be determined with a
parameter estimation procedure. Also here, different methods
have been mentioned in the literature, such as the Maximum
Likelihood Estimators (MLE) method and the Range Interval
Method (RIM). These methods have been evaluated in
reference 11; it was concluded that the MLE method is the
preferred method. For example, the MLE method does not
require any information other than the actual "hit/miss" data.
An example of the construction of a POD curve from
"hit/miss" data following the aforementioned method (log-
normal POD function, MLE parameter estimation procedure)
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is given in figure 3 (from Ref. 6). This figure gives the mean
POD curve (50 % confidence) and the lower-bound POD curve
with a 95 % confidence level. In this example the reliably
detectable flaw size ad has been defined as the 90/95 POD/CL
value yielding a 2.6 mm crack length.
Crack growth data not available
For some inspection points crack growth data may not be
available. In that case it is not possible anymore to estimate
the previously missed crack sizes for each crack detected
during an inspection. It is also not possible then to construct
a POD curve from the available "hit" data. However, the crack
detection data can still be used in a limited approach to obtain
information about the detectable crack size by constructing a
detection threshold histogram (Ref. 10). For this purpose, the
available data are grouped in appropriate intervals of detected
crack size, and a histogram is made of the frequency of
detection versus crack size. The histogram can yield
information such as the sensitivity of inspection (detection
threshold) and the mean crack size detected.
A further approach is to assume a Probability Density Function
(PDF) for the crack sizes detected and to calculate its integral
i.e. the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). In analogy
with the aforementioned POD(ai) calculation (with both "hit"
and "miss" data available) a log-normal PDF is assumed for
the crack sizes detected ("hit" data):
where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the log
(2)PDF: f (a) 1
aσ 2π
e
1
2
ln(a) µ
σ
2
crack sizes detected.
Next, a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) can be
constructed, indicating the probability that the detected crack
size has a value less than or equal to [a]:
To illustrate the PDF/CDF approach the inspection data of
(3)CDF: F(a) ⌡⌠
x a
x 0
f (x) dx
figure 3 (from Ref. 6) have been reviewed. The data comprise
79 "hits", 206 "misses" and only 1 false call. The PDF and
CDF for the "hit" data are shown in figure 5. The mean and
standard deviation are 2.3 mm and 1.2 mm crack length,
respectively. These parameters have been determined with the
least squares estimates procedure (in fact, first the µ and σ of
ln(a) have been calculated). The goodness-of-fit for the data is
shown in figure 6. Figure 5 allows an estimation of the
detection threshold (about 0.5 mm) and of the crack length [a]
for which there is a 90 % probability that the detected cracks
have a length less than or equal to [a] (a = 3.8 mm). The
reliably detectable crack length ad can not be extracted from
the CDF.
In figure 7 both the CDF for the "hit" data and the mean POD
curve (confidence level 50 %) for the "hit/miss" data from
figure 3 have been drawn. A 90 % probability criterion yields
the crack lengths 3.8 mm and 2.4 mm for the CDF and POD
curve, respectively. These values can not be compared directly:
3.8 mm is the crack length for which there is a 90 %
probability that the detected cracks have a length less than or
equal to this 3.8 mm, while 2.4 mm is the crack length for
which there is a 90 % probability of detection (the 90/95
POD/CL value is a 2.6 mm crack length).
In general, the 90 % probability flaw size calculated from a
CDF will be larger than the flaw size with a 90 % probability
of detection. It can be concluded that the CDF can not give an
exact value of the reliably detectable flaw size ad, but it can
give a conservative estimate of this ad.
7. RNLAF F-16 FIELD INSPECTION DATA
The CAMS system registers the field inspection data of about
65 ASIP points in F-16 aircraft. At the moment there is an
extensive CAMS data base but the amount of crack detection
data is still limited because:
- Some ASIP points have large inspection intervals (e.g.
exceeding 1000 flight hours) and hence acquire few
inspection data.
- For a large number of ASIP points (almost) no cracks
are detected.
- For some ASIP points the available crack detection data
are the result of a first inspection, so that information of
previously missed crack sizes can not be extracted.
- For some ASIP points the CAMS data base has not been
kept up with completely (e.g. discipline of data filling-
out).
The result is that at the moment for only a few ASIP points a
sufficient number of crack detection data is available from
which a relevant "hit/miss" data base can be deducted. As an
example, ASIP control point 3005 will be taken to show the
intrinsic possibilities of further analysis of field inspection
data.
ASIP 3005 deals with the inspection of the tab radii in the
F-16 16B5120 center fuselage longeron, see figure 8. The
longeron is a tee-extrusion machined from 2024-T62
aluminium, and functions to distribute flight loads from the
fuselage upper skin to the center fuselage structure. High
positive g-loads may cause fatigue cracking in the tab radii of
the longeron. NDI involves a manual eddy current inspection
technique using a standard eddy current phase-analysis
instrument and a 50-200 kHz shielded pencil-probe (Ref. 8).
The current value for the reliably detectable crack size ad has
been set at a through-crack (0.090 inch plate thickness) with
a length of 0.10 inch.
The crack growth curve for the ASIP 3005 control point is
shown in figure 9. It is in fact a durability crack growth curve
with an initial flaw size of 0.007 x 0.007 inch and a functional
impairment crack size of 0.187 inch. Durability is not a safety
life concept but an economic life concept; the durability life
represents the life for which flaws will not grow to an extent
that requires extensive repair before one design service life.
ASIP 3005 is treated as a durability item (and not as a damage
tolerance item) because the 16B5120 longeron is believed not
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to be a safety of flight structure; the predicted durability life
is 4320 flight hours (Ref. 12).
The current inspection interval is 200 flight hours; it is in fact
not based on the crack growth data of figure 9 but on a former
durability analysis of the aircraft manufacturer using a different
crack growth curve. That analysis resulted in a relatively short
interval (less than 100 flight hours) which was rounded up to
a phase inspection interval of 200 flight hours, however,
because of the longeron not being a safety of flight structure.
The available CAMS field inspection data of ASIP 3005 are
given in table 1. This table lists for 27 aircraft the actual crack
lengths detected and an estimation of the crack lengths missed
during the previous inspections (between brackets). For this
crack length estimation the crack growth curve in figure 9 was
used. It is possible that in practice some cracks have been
missed and which are hence not included in table 1. This will
however only influence the size of the NDI data base and not
significantly the shape of the POD curve (and ad assessment).
In total, the inspection results yield 28 "hit" data points and 36
"miss" data points (in total 64 "hit/miss" data points). These
data points have been used to draw a CDF and a mean POD
curve, see figure 10. The two curves correlate remarkably well
and show that the sensitivity of inspection (detection threshold)
is about 0.02 inch (0.5 mm). Further, a 90 % probability
criterion yields the crack lengths of 0.093 inch (2.4 mm) and
0.108 inch (2.7 mm) for the POD and CDF curve, respectively.
Without defining a specific confidence level on the POD to
determine the reliably detectable crack size ad, the POD curve
in figure 10 indicates that the ad value lies in the range of
0.10 inch. This value is equal to the currently used value of ad
for ASIP 3005 and for other comparable ASIP points inspected
with the manual eddy current technique. Finally, it is
emphasized again that the CDF can not give an exact value but
only a conservative estimate of ad.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper the possibilities within the RNLAF maintenance
system to establish reliability data relevant for the in-service
nondestructive inspection of F-16 airframe structure have been
described. It has been shown that an evaluation of the CAMS
field inspection data and crack growth data allows an
estimation of the sensitivity and reliability of inspection for the
structural details concerned. The results of such an evaluation
can be used to revise the current values of the ASIP inspection
intervals.
For the ASIP 3005 inspection point it has been shown that the
reliably detectable flaw size lies in the same range as the
currently used value of ad (0.10 inch). So, in this particular
case no revision of the currently used inspection interval is
proposed. It is nevertheless a remarkable outcome because it
has often been suggested that the value of 0.10 inch is on the
very conservative side for this inspection configuration. A
quick survey of the field inspection data in table 1 does also
suggest this. The lesson learned is thus that realistic values for
ad are often larger than generally assumed.
The ASIP 3005 evaluation has demonstrated that the CAMS
field inspection data can, in principle, be used to determine
more realistic ad values and hence more realistic values of the
ASIP inspection intervals. For most ASIP points, however, the
ad and ∆I evaluation can not yet be performed because of the
limited amount of crack detection data in the CAMS data base,
see chapter 7. Some possibilities to overcome this limitation
are:
- Stringent maintenance of the CAMS data base.
- Combination of crack detection data for ASIP points
with comparable inspection configuration such as
location and inspection technique (for example for the
carry-through bulkhead ASIP points).
- Combination of RNLAF crack detection data with
comparable crack detection data of other Air Forces.
Estimation of previously missed crack sizes can then be
done using crack growth curves incorporating a Crack
Severity Index (CSI) for differences in base usage (load
spectrum).
For the last item it is recommended to perform this activity
within the framework of a NATO RTO Working Group to be
established.
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Table 1 Available CAMS field inspection data of ASIP 3005; inspection of the tab radii in the
F-16 16B5120 center fuselage longeron.
Listing of actual crack length [inch] detected and estimation of crack lengths missed
during previous phased inspections (between brackets).
Aircraft
CAMS Code
Phased Inspection Times (Flight Hours)
1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800
A1869 RH - - - - - 0.049
A1870 LH - - - - - 0.03
A1870 RH - - - - - 0.11
A1871 RH 0.05
A1873 RH - - 0.049
A1874 RH - - - - - (0.029) (0.035) 0.047
A1875 RH - - - (0.025) 0.03
A1876 RH - - - - - (0.038) 0.05
A3199 RH - (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A3202 RH - - - (0.025) 0.03
A3203 RH - - (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A3204 RH - - (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A3208 RH - - - (0.025) 0.03
A3209 RH - - (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A3616 RH - - - - - (0.030) 0.039
A3620 RH - - - - - (0.026) (0.031) 0.04
A3623 RH - - - - - (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A3624 RH - - - - (0.031) 0.04
A3643 RH - - - (0.025) 0.03
A3657 RH - - - - - (0.064) 0.15
A4360 RH - - (0.038) 0.05
A4361 RH - - (0.025) 0.03
A4362 RH - - (0.025) 0.03
A5136 RH - (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A5137 LH - - (0.021) (0.025) 0.03
A8213 LH - - (0.065) 0.157
A8255 LH - - - - (0.017) 0.019
A8267 LH - - - - - - (0.053) (0.080) 0.236
Dash (-) means: no inspection data available
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Fig. 3 Construction of a probability of detection (POD) curve, with its lower 95% confidence bound, from “hit/miss” data
[Fig. 16 from Ref. 6].
Log-normal POD model with MLE parameter estimation procedure.
Reliably detectable flaw size ad is 2.6 mm (here defined as the 90/95% POD/CL flaw size)
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Fig. 2 The four possible outcomes of an inspection
POD FCP POR
correct
rejection
detection
A11
flawed specimens
N1
N specimens
false
rejection
detection
A12
correct
acceptance
no detection
A22
false
acceptance
no detection
A21
unflawed specimens
N2
• Probability of detection : POD = A11/N1
• Probability of recognition : POR = A22/N2
• Probability of false calls : FCP = A12/N2
ai = initial flaw size
ad = reliably detectableflaw size
ac = critical flaw size
SL = safety limit
I1 = initial inspection time(e.g.  ½·SL)
 = available inspection time
I = inspection interval
(e.g.  ½·)
Flaw
size
Time
IcI3I2I1 Id

SL
I I
ac
ad
ai
Fig. 1 Damage tolerance approach for inspectable structures.
Determination of the initial inspection time I1 and the inspection interval I
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Fig. 5 Probability Density Function (PDF) and Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the “hit” data
(79 cracks detected) from figure 3
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Fig. 4 Crack growth curve for a fictive ASIP control point, with the crack detected at the 4th inspection.
Estimation of the crack sizes missed during the previous inspections I1 (initial inspection), I2 and I3
ai = initial flaw size
ad = reliably detectableflaw size
ac = critical flaw size
SL = safety limit
 = available inspection time
I = inspection interval ½ · 
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Fig. 7 Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the “hit” data and Probability of Detection curve (POD, 50% confidence
level) for the “hit/miss” data from figure 3
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Fig. 6 Goodness-of-fit for the log-normal PDF estimation for the “hit” data from figure 3.
Standard normal variate z = (ln(a)–) /  and its corresponding cumulative probability versus the crack length 
detected, plotted on log-normal probability paper
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Fig. 10 CDF of 28 “hit” data points and mean POD curve of 64 “hit/miss” data points for the inspection of ASIP 3005, 
tab radii in the F-16 center fuselage longeron
Fig. 9 Crack growth curve for the F-16 ASIP 3005 control
point [Fig. 8.2.2-2 from Ref. 12]
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Fig. 8 F-16 ASIP 3005 inspection point. Manual eddy
current inspection of the tab radii in the center
fuselage longeron [Fig. 6-12 from Ref. 8]
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